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In the US, at the end of 2010 Congress extended the
ethanol tax credit (VEETC) of $0.45/gal. for one year with
the clear message to the industry and lobby groups that it
wanted a long-term solution to be passed and implemented
by the end of 2011. Following are some of the policy
options that are being considered in 2011:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Continue the 45 cent/gallon subsidy and the import
tariff as at present
Shift the subsidy from blender to biofuel producer
Subsidy that varies with the price of crude oil or
gasoline
Subsidy based at least in part on performance in
reducing GHG
Subsidy based on energy content of the biofuel
Subsidy that is applied only for the quantity of biofuel
in excess of the RFS
Eliminate the subsidy and the import tariff, and use
funds for other purposes
Combinations of these options

We will describe and discuss the pros and cons of each
of these options in turn below. However, before the one by
one explanation, it is useful to indicate that the Renewable
Fuel Standard (RFS2) and the blend wall are the driving
forces in the biofuels market today. The blend wall is due to
the 10 percent ethanol blend used in the U.S. today [1]. We
consume about 138 billion gallons of gasoline type fuel
annually. Ten percent of that would be 13.8 billion gallons,
but we cannot blend 10 percent everywhere and throughout
the year for a number of reasons. Our estimate of the
effective blend wall is about 12.5 billion gallons. Production
in 2010 was higher, but the U.S. exported an estimated 350
million gallons in 2010 [2]. EPA announced that they would
approve an expansion of the blend percentage from 10 to
15 percent but only for automotive vehicles built since 2001
and excluding motorcycles, lawn mowers, marine engines,
and other small engines. It is unclear if EPA will be able to
implement the higher blending percentage and even if they
do, to what extent the industry will adopt it. So long as the
blending percentage stays at 10 percent, the blend wall is
the major issue for the ethanol industry. The only way
around that limit would be to rapidly grow the E85 market,
but for a number of reasons, that will be very difficult to do in
the short run [3]. To be competitive with E10, E85 must be
priced at 78% of E10 or less. If E10 retails for $3.50, E85
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would have to retail for $2.73 or less to be
economically competitive. That is difficult to do
when the wholesale costs for gasoline and ethanol
are in this range as they were in March 2011.
Given the overshadowing importance of the blend
wall, the policy option that is adopted for the
subsidy does not matter as much because the
operative constraint is the blend limit. However, if
we are developing policy for the longer term, it is
important to understand well the various options.
Bearing this in mind, we will review the
consequences of the different policy options that
have been proposed.

Continue the Status quo
Perhaps the greatest barrier to this option is the
federal government budget cost. At 2011 blending
levels, the cost would be about $5.8 billion per
year. When Congress is looking everywhere for
cuts, this one may become a target, especially
given that with the blend wall in effect, not much of
the subsidy reaches the ethanol producer. Most of
the subsidy is divided between the ethanol blender
and the consumer in the form of lower E10 prices
[1].
Maintaining the ethanol tariff also would
continue to displease Brazil, even though exports
in 2010 were miniscule. Brazil is producing more
sugar and less ethanol as world sugar prices have
surged. So currently they export little ethanol, but
would want to be in a position to resume exports
again once world market conditions change.
Maintaining the subsidy, if the blend wall is
relaxed, also would help keep corn prices high,
which is supported by corn farmers but not by
livestock producers or the food production and
distribution industries.

Switch to a Producer Subsidy instead of a
Blender Tax Credit
As indicated above, currently the VEETC
(blenders’ credit) is not reaching the ethanol
producer as it has in the past, due mainly to the
blend wall. Ethanol producers believe that
switching to a refundable producer credit would
change that to insure that producers did get the
credit. The credit would probably need to be
refundable because many ethanol producers might
not have enough tax liability to absorb the entire
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amount of the credit. With this change, the
producers would receive the credit, but it is not at
all clear that they would be able to keep it, as the
ethanol price would be determined by supply and
demand forces in the market place. Those same
supply and demand forces would be operative
whether the credit is initially received by the
ethanol blender or the ethanol producer. Thus what
appears on the surface to be an improvement for
the producer likely would result in no change.
In addition, if the switch were made to the
ethanol producer, a way would have to be found to
prevent the ethanol that received the subsidy from
being exported. Administratively, it might be
difficult to control the movement of the ethanol
once it left the production facility.

Subsidy that Varies with the Price of Crude
Oil or Gasoline
Tyner and others have introduced a biofuel
subsidy that varies with the price of crude oil or
gasoline [1]. In this proposal, there is a price of
crude oil (or gasoline) at which the subsidy begins,
say $90/bbl., and a rate of change of the subsidy. If
the start point were $90 crude oil, there would be
no biofuel subsidy when crude oil is over that price.
When crude oil is below that price, the subsidy
would be equal to ($90 – Pc)*C. So if crude oil
were $50 and the rate of change 0.015, then the
subsidy would be 60 cents per gallon. This system
is designed to provide a safety net for ethanol
producers when crude oil prices are lower without
providing the subsidy when crude oil prices are
high. In terms of operation, the subsidy would
probably change each quarter, with the subsidy in
quarter two being based on the average crude oil
(or gasoline) price in quarter one. Thus, the
subsidy would always be based on crude oil or
gasoline prices lagged one quarter. It also could be
done on a monthly basis, but the added
administrative cost probably would exceed the gain
from a more frequent change.
Another variant that has been proposed is that
the subsidy would vary with the difference between
the ethanol and gasoline wholesale prices [4].
Under this proposal, the subsidy would be equal to
the difference between ethanol and gasoline prices
up to the max level of $0.45. If the difference were
negative (gasoline greater than ethanol), the
subsidy would be zero. Thus the subsidy would be
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zero for much of the time since the norm is that
gasoline is greater than ethanol. This alternative
could work in the absence of the blend wall.
However, with the binding blend wall, ethanol is
priced on corn, not on gasoline. Between March
and October 2010, the correlation between weekly
corn and ethanol prices was $0.98. If corn price
goes up, ethanol price goes up. With constant
gasoline price, a variable subsidy based on the
ethanol/gasoline margin would have the subsidy
increasing as corn price increased, increasing the
incentive to produce and increasing corn demand.
In the case with no blend wall, ethanol regains
its price relationship with gasoline. That is, there is
a high correlation between gasoline and ethanol
price. While there might be short-term fluctuations,
with no blend wall the prices have moved closely
together. In that event, this ethanol/gasoline
difference based subsidy remains essentially a
fixed subsidy since the two prices move together.
What may make the gasoline – ethanol spread
seem attractive is that in the past couple of years,
we have moved between an ethanol price based
on gasoline to one based on corn. The point here
is that there are problems with the price spread
approach whichever regime plays out in the future,
the spread approach does not function as
envisioned in many circumstances.
Some have argued that the subsidy should be
based on the ethanol/corn spread as is done in
California [4]. That could work for a small part of
the total market, but if it covered the national
market, it would provide a strong incentive to
expand production. The ethanol corn/spread goes
down, the subsidy goes up, which increases the
incentive to produce, which increases the corn
price, which decreases the ethanol/corn spread,
and the cycle continues. At a national level, over
time this approach would result in the max subsidy
permitted under the system, and would provide
added pressure on corn prices.
Also, while public reliable data is available on
gasoline (RBOB) and crude oil (NYMEX or WTI),
the same is not true for ethanol. There is lots of
regional variability in the ethanol market. So even
constructing the margin could prove problematic.
Another possibility would be to base the credit
on crude oil futures prices rather than current
market prices. That could be done, but would not
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change the levels much as the market and near
futures prices contain very similar information. That
is, there is a high correlation between near term
futures and current market prices.
One impact of the variable subsidy option that
would need to be considered is the effect on RIN
markets. In the early phases of implementation of
this system, there could be some disruption in the
RIN markets as market players learned how to
adjust to the new ground rules. However, after an
adjustment period, the RIN markets likely would
function efficiently under a subsidy that varied with
the price of crude or gasoline.

Subsidy Based in Part on Performance in
Reducing GHG
One of the national objectives in promoting
renewable fuels is to reduce GHG emissions. This
proposal focuses on that objective in that it
rewards ethanol plants to the extent that they
reduce GHG emissions. Essentially, the subsidy
would be divided into two parts: 1) a fixed
component, say 20 cents per gallon, and 2) a
component that would be a function of the extent to
which each ethanol plant reduced GHG emissions.
The fixed component either could be a fixed
amount per gallon of biofuel or a fixed amount per
energy unit of biofuel produced. That is, it could be
volume or energy content based. Implementing this
option would require a means of certifying the
carbon footprint for each ethanol facility. In
essence, this certification would require estimation
of the total GHG for the plant from the farm through
the ethanol consumption, as would be required to
obtain certification for a non-default number for the
California
Low
Carbon
Fuel
Standard.
Alternatively, it could be based on the GHG
footprint for the conversion facility alone. The
advantage of this approach is that at least part of
the subsidy would be “pay for performance” and
would provide an incentive for plants to reduce
their carbon footprint. A disadvantage would be
that it might be costly to certify the carbon footprint
for each plant and to repeat the certification each
time the plant made investments to reduce its
carbon footprint. We would need to get a good idea
of how large this cost would be to ascertain the
potential viability of this approach.
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Subsidy Based on the Energy Content of
the Biofuel
At present both the corn ethanol subsidy of
$0.45/gal. and the cellulose biofuel subsidy of
$1.01/gal. are solely based on the volume of
biofuel produced with no reference to the amount
of energy produced. Particularly for the cellulosic
biofuel, the volumetric basis for the subsidy favors
biofuels like ethanol with a relatively low energy
content because they receive a higher subsidy per
unit of energy. The amount of foreign oil displaced
depends on the energy content of the biofuel. A
subsidy that is based on energy content is
considered technology neutral. That is, the signal it
sends is that the government wants to encourage
renewable energy production and leaves it to the
private sector to determine the most economical
way to produce BTUs of renewable energy. For
example, if we take the $1.01/gal. current subsidy
for cellulosic biofuel and say that is pegged to biogasoline, then a gallon of cellulosic ethanol would
receive a subsidy of $0.67, and a gallon of
cellulosic diesel would receive a subsidy of about
$1.14. So instead of subsidizing a volume of
biofuel, this approach would subsidize biofuels
based on their energy content. It levels the playing
field among the different competing biofuel
technologies. The Renewable Fuel Standard
already takes this approach in that the RINs a
biofuel receives are based on the energy content
of the biofuel.

Subsidy Available only to the Quantity of
Biofuel in Excess of the RFS
Many economists have argued that under
certain circumstances the subsidy is redundant if
we have a binding RFS mandate [5-7]. This
alternative makes the subsidy available only to the
quantity of biofuel blended (or produced,
depending on where the subsidy is applied) in
excess of the RFS. This option would substantially
reduce the government budget cost of the subsidy
as only the biofuel blended in excess of the RFS
would receive the subsidy. According to the
Renewable Fuel Association, we will have in 2012
14.6 billion gallons of ethanol production capacity,
and the 2012 RFS for corn ethanol is 13.2 billion
gallons. If all the capacity were used for domestic
markets, the subsidy under this proposal would
only apply to 1.4 billion gallons instead of the entire
14.6 billion, thereby saving $5.9 billion at the
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current subsidy rate.
This policy option would have no impact on
corn demand relative to the current policy. Thus,
whatever pressure exists on corn prices from the
current policy would continue under this
alternative.
The main impact of this policy would be in the
RIN markets, and it would be complicated because
there are unique RINs for each category of biofuels
in the RFS. The proposed mechanism for
implementing this option is through the RIN
system. The blender would receive a tax credit for
any RIN submitted beyond their blending
obligation. For the conventional biofuels category,
if a blender knows that they will receive 45 cents
per gallon for every gallon blended beyond the
RFS, then the RIN value, perhaps especially
towards the end of the year, would approach 45
cents. Historically, RIN prices have been much
lower than that.
There
would
also
be
complicated
implementation and enforcement issues. RINs are
administered by the EPA, and the blender’s tax
credit is administered by the IRS. So the EPA and
IRS would have to coordinate carefully. In addition,
since the VEETC is applicable to blenders, and
“obligated parties” under the RFS2 are sometimes
blenders and sometimes refiners or others, it could
be very complicated to implement a system under
this proposal that could function effectively.

Eliminate the Subsidy and Import Tariff and
Use the Resources to Expand Demand
This option would phase out the subsidy and
import tariff but retain the equivalent amount of
government resources to subsidize expansion of
blender pumps, E85 pumps, and other
infrastructure. A common perception in industry is
that much of the current subsidy is not reaching
ethanol producers and that given the blend wall,
the bigger problem is expanding ethanol demand.
Thus, this approach argues for using government
resources to help create the infrastructure needed
for E85 and other blends. As Tyner et al. have
documented [3], the amount of investment needed
to create the infrastructure is large, and this policy
approach is designed to get the investment
moving.
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Perhaps the biggest problem with this option is
that even if the infrastructure exists, the price of
E85 would have to be competitive with E10 to get
consumers to purchase E85. As indicated earlier, if
the retail price of E10 is $3.50, E85 would have to
be $2.73 or lower to entice consumers to purchase
E85. It is not at all clear that E85 can be produced
and marketed for 78% of the price of E10, which is
what would be needed. Some argue that if the
infrastructure exits, oil companies would be forced
to cross-subsidize E85 because they would have
to meet the RFS levels that rise to 15 bil. gal. in
2015. The market might eventually evolve that
way, but it is likely to be slow to get going.
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